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CRISIS AS USUAL - POPULIST GOVERNANCE AND THE PANDEMIC  
 
Abstract 
Populists in Hungary had to manage the crisis from government position. Orbán has shown strong 
leadership during the crisis and dominated the political context of the issue. However, the usual 
elements of the ‘populist myth’ characterizing Orbán’s and Fidesz’s ordinary communication were 
adopted to interpret and frame the COVID-19 crisis. Within this narrative, the leader and its people 
together fight for ‘the Hungarians’ national interests and freedom against the interconnected 
international and national enemies who seriously threat these interests and freedom for their own 
political and economic benefits. The pro-government political and media actors’ communication were 
characterized by strong people-centrism, criticism towards the EU and the international ‘liberal 
mainstream’ including NGOs and media, and polarizing narratives that presented opposition actors 
as serving foreign political interests. As a reversed form of politicization, any criticism coming from 
social or political actors were immediately labelled as ‘political’ 
 
MÁRTON BENE, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
ZSOLT BODA, Hungarian Academy of Sciences (boda.zsolt@tk.mta.hu) 
 
Introduction 
Hungary is a special case in the European Union: since 2010 the country is governed by the populist 
right-wing party coalition of Fidesz and the Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (Fidesz and Christian 
Democratic People’s Party, KDNP – hereafter referred to as Fidesz since the KDNP plays only a 
subordinated role). The governance of Fidesz has been long characterized by markedly populist 
elements like majoritarianism, anti-pluralism and illiberal tendencies, polarizing politics, strong 
leadership, and a direct communication with the electorate (Bartha et al., 2020). Fidesz has been very 
active in communication and constant campaigning, conveying a ‘populist myth’ (Körösényi et al., 
2020): the construction of the ‘hard-working Hungarian people’ coupled with criticism towards the 
EU, anti-immigration discourse, and adversarial narratives concerning unpopular minorities 
(LMBTQ people, Gipsies). The pandemic has not brought about substantially new development in 
this respect: Fidesz simply adapted its communication patterns and political logic to the 
circumstances. Migrants have been blamed for the pandemic and the EU for inadequate policies; 
polarizing narratives have kept being echoed about the political opposition; and the government has 
made controversial decisions in order to weaken the opposition parties and municipalities governed 
by them. Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, has shown strong leadership and health policy measures have 
been symbolically militarized. However, at the same time the government has not been hostile to 
medical expertise and the imposed precautionary measures have effectively contained the spread of 
the disease.  
 
 
1. Political context 
Since 2010 Hungary has been governed by Fidesz, a right-wing party and its unquestioned leader, 
Orbán who has been serving as Prime Minister. Since 2010 Fidesz has won three parliamentary 
elections with a constitutional majority (two-third of the seats) due to four main reasons. First, in 
2010 the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt – MSZP), the leading force of the left, 
collapsed under corruption charges and the heavy consequences of the 2007-2009 economic crisis. 
MSZP split under the crisis and in 2010 two new parties, the radical right-wing Jobbik (Jobbik 
Magyarországért – For a Better Hungary) and the green LMP (Lehet Más a Politika – Another Politics 
is Possible) also formed groups in the parliament. Since then the fragmented and poorly organized 
opposition could not propose a convincing political alternative to the rule of Fidesz. Second, the past 
 
 
decade brought about a fast-economic recovery coupled with an increasing inflow of EU-money to 
Hungary. This has created a favourable economic situation in the country and growing prosperity to 
large segments of the society. Third, Fidesz has used its comfortable parliamentary majority not only 
to initiate a series of radical policy changes, but also to alter the system of institutional checks and 
balances and create illiberal reforms that strengthen its power position. Fidesz unilaterally passed a 
new constitution and changed the electoral system to its own advantage. Fourth, although the 
government has not been engaged in ‘macroeconomic populism’ (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1990) and 
has pursued a rather responsible, or even neoliberal fiscal policy (cutting spending on social benefits, 
health care, and education) it has managed through a series of well-targeted policy measures and 
active communication to create legitimacy for its decisions. For instance, the slogan of ‘workfare 
society’ legitimised the cutting of unemployment benefits and the introduction of the compulsory 
public works programme for the unemployed as well as the tying of family support schemes to legal 
(taxable) income. This policy package has an implicit anti-Gipsy message (Bartha et al., 2020).   
Originally a moderate conservative party, in the past decade Fidesz has been gradually radicalizing 
both in terms of policy positions and communication patterns. Today it has an uncompromising anti-
immigration stance, upholds the traditional family model, questions the rights of LMBTQ people, 
and conveys anti-EU messages sometimes rooted in blatant conspiracy theories. Although Fidesz is 
member of the European People’s Party group in the European Parliament, its membership was 
suspended as during the 2019 European Parliamentary election campaign the party used posters on 
which Jean-Claude Juncker, then the president of the European Commission, was portrayed with 
Hungarian-American billionaire and philanthropist George Soros with the caption: ‘You have the 
right to know what Brussels is up to!’. Fidesz spends huge amounts on communication and uses 
various channels. The public broadcasting has become a propaganda channel for the government 
where politicians of the opposition have practically no chance to be invited to. Through 
businesspersons close to the government Fidesz controls most of the commercial radio stations, many 
daily and weekly newspapers and the overwhelming majority of public billboards (Polyák, 2019). 
That is, Hungarian media is characterized by an extreme form of parallelism, with little overlap 
between the thematization of the pro-governmental and the independent media universes. Besides its 
active media policy, the government regularly organizes so-called National Consultations in which 
the citizens are asked about current political issues. However, the results of the National Consultations 
are not transparent and accountable and the whole institutions is more about conveying manipulative 
messages than to gather inputs from the people (Batory & Svensson, 2019). 
While in 2010 Jobbik, a radical right-wing party was its main rival, Fidesz has managed to take over 
the messages of Jobbik on law and order measures, compulsory public works for the unemployed, 
cultural war against the liberal elite, extreme nationalism, and hostility towards immigration. Today 
Jobbik, seriously weakened, seems to be more moderate, more liberal and pro-European than Fidesz. 
Fidesz, while dominating the legislation, has been also the strongest party at the local level. At the 
municipal elections of both 2010 and 2014 it was by far the most successful party gaining majority 
in all regional councils, winning all (but one: Szeged) of the major cities, including Budapest, the 
capital city. However, the 2019 municipal elections brought about a breakthrough of the coalition of 
opposition parties. Although Fidesz remained the most popular party it was defeated in half of the 
major cities. Budapest elected Gergely Karácsony, the candidate of the opposition for mayor and the 
coalition of opposition parties won in most of the districts in the capital city. The key of the success 
of the opposition was to overcome its fragmentation and create a coalition for the elections. In 
Hungary it meant the cooperation of the left-wing, liberal, green and right-wing opposition parties of 
the opposition. At the local level some other actors, like civil organizations and other, smaller parties 
have also joined in. It is obvious that these coalitions are extremely fragile and their political survival 
is far from being evident. Nevertheless, the municipal elections of November 2019 put a dent into the 
myth of invincibility of Orbán and Fidesz. It is a major political change since 2010 and provides an 
important element of the political context at the time of pandemic.  
 
 
It is also important that the critiques of health care policy are one of the main topics of the opposition 
since 2010. They often emphasize that the government neglect health care system which is thereby 
in terrible state. Over the last ten years, several anti-government demonstration and campaign have 
been organized to protest against the government’s health care policy. Polls also often show that 
people perceive the state of health care system as the most important problem the country faces34. 
 
Table 7.1 Main Hungarian political parties (>5% in the last general election) 
Political party 2018 general election  2019 European election  
 Vote shares* Seats Vote shares Seats 
In power     
Fidesz – KDNP 49,6% 133 52,6% 13 
In opposition      
Jobbik 19,2% 26 6,3% 1 
MSZP – PM 13% 20 6,6% 1 
DK 5,4% 9 16% 4 
LMP 7,1% 8   
Momentum - - 9,9% 2 
*The Hungarian system consists of a combination of individual mandates and party lists. The vote 
share data refer to the latter. 
 
 
2. COVID-19 diffusion and political measures  
As in many other European countries, the government reacted early to the news about the pandemic 
and set up on January 31 the so-called Operational Group. This government body has been 
responsible for monitoring the epidemiological situation, coordinating the measures taken as a 
response to the pandemic and providing the public with the necessary information. The Operational 
Group held lengthy daily press conferences televised real time – however, since the middle of March 
journalists could not ask questions on the spot, they had to send in their questions beforehand by e-
mail. The Operational Group did not answer all questions and especially independent journalists and 
media outlets have been complaining about no response to their queries. 
The first cases of COVID-19 were identified in March. As a response, on March 11 2020, the 
government declared the state of emergency. From this time on the government issued a series of 
emergency decrees, in which it partially suspended the application of certain acts as well as enacted 
new regulations. Arrivals from Italy, China, South Korea and Iran were banned, just like indoor 
events involving more than 100 and outdoor events involving more than 500 participants. On March 
13th the prime minister announced the closure of all kinds of educational institutions. Three days later 
further restrictive measures were announced by Orbán: the borders of Hungary were closed, so that 
only Hungarian citizens were allowed to enter the country; all public and social events were banned. 
From March 27th physical movement of citizens was restricted too. 
On March 30th the parliament passed the Coronavirus Act (labelled as Authorization Act) which 
permitted to the government to rule by decrees without any functional or time limitation, without any 
debate in the legislation, and without any guarantee for immediate constitutional review. The Act 
stirred heavy criticisms from both internal and international actors as a potentially damaging move 
for democracy. MPs of the European Parliament raised concerns about the Act and warned about the 
rule of law. However, 2.5 month later, on June 16th the parliament called back the Coronavirus Act 
and the government triumphed over its critics, arguing that people who had accused the government 
of dictatorship were calumniators. But the same day the parliament also voted for a previously 
unknown legal order, the so-called ‘health crisis situation’ in which upon the declaration of the 
Surgeon General the government acquires special powers again. 
 
34 E.g. Standard Eurobarometer 92, November 2019, Hungarian country report. 
 
 
From the beginning of April to mid-May Hungary was experiencing the speeding up of local 
transmission. One of the most significant measures in this period was the ordering of public hospitals 
to free up 60% of their capacity, equalling 36 thousand beds. On April 7 there were around 800 known 
cases so the capacity made available largely exceeded the foreseeable need, while rumours were 
spreading about the dramatic fate of the patients that had been forced to go home. Then and since the 
political opposition has made several attempts to criticize the hasty decision, but failed to provide 
convincing evidences about the consequences to the public. From the end of April the government 
started to selectively lift lockdown measures, and finally ending the emergency situation on June 16. 
Overall Hungary has managed to contain the spread of the disease fairly effectively and the number 
of both known COVID cases and COVID-related deaths have remained relatively low (see Figure 
7.1 and Table 7.2). 
As part of the emergency measures the government introduced a series of decisions aimed at 
alleviating the economic hardship. These included tax exemptions for small businesses and individual 
entrepreneurs, the acceleration of VAT refunds to improve the solvency of small and medium size 
enterprises, and the extension of taxation related deadlines. On the other hand, in order to generate 
additional revenues new surtaxes on credit institutions and the retail sector were introduced, transfers 
to municipalities and the state subsidies of political parties were curtailed. 
While the government started a communication campaign already during the lockdown advertising 
the governmental measures and their supposed effectiveness the opposition has argued that 
Hungary, unlike most of the European countries, fell short of providing large-scale subsidies to 
businesses for the preservation of workplaces and that several targeted financial aids went directly 
to businesspeople close to the government. 
 
Figure 7.1 Daily death toll and new cases in Hungary 
 
Source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
Phase 1: pre-Covid-19; Phase 2: spread and containment measures; Phase 3: contagion mitigation 
 
Table 7.2 COVID-19 pandemic in Hungary 
Cases 4,027 
Total deaths 551 
Total recovered 2,355 
Cases for 1 M pop 417 
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Source: www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ (update 10/6/2020) 
 
 
3. Populist discourse at the time of COVID-19 
During the pandemic the same populist arguments and frames appeared in the communication of the 
governmental politicians than in normal periods therefore the dominant discourse has changed little. 
As Körösényi, Illés and Gyulai (2020) argued there is an overarching narrative behind the 
communication of the Orbán-regime, the so-called ‘populist myth’ (Casullo, 2020), whose main 
elements are applied to interpret any major political issue and crisis. The central narrative of this 
populist myth is that the leader and its people together fight for ‘the Hungarians’ national interests 
and freedom against the interconnected international and national enemies who seriously threat these 
interests and freedom for their own political and economic benefits. This ‘populist myth’ makes 
charismatic leadership possible as it creates a charismatic bond between the leader and its followers 
and maintain the leader’s capacity to act in a highly flexible way (Körösényi et al., 2020: 59-61). 
Orbán’s charismatic leadership was a central feature of the Hungarian crisis management (see, 
Merkovity et al., 2020), and the commonly used elements of this ‘populist myth’ pervaded the 
government communication of the crisis. In the construction and dissemination of this discourse, the 
government communication could also draw upon the centrally organized extensive pro-government 
media network that uncritically produced and echoed the elements of this narrative. 
The ‘people’ were a constant reference point to the government’s, and especially Orbán’s 
communication. During the crisis, people were usually referred as ‘Hungarians’ as an inclusive but 
homogenizing label which is a commonly used concept to describe the objects of the political 
representation in the Orbán-regime. The main official slogans of the crisis communication were ‘No 
Hungarian is alone’ and ‘every Hungarian is responsible for every Hungarian’, and Viktor Orbán 
often discussed and analysed the attributes, behaviour, efforts and performance of the ‘Hungarians’. 
In these talks, Orbán always painted a very favourable picture about ‘Hungarians’ and describe them 
as highly disciplined, intelligent, brave, helpful and sympathetic. He also frequently talked about the 
everyday difficulties ‘Hungarians’ face during the pandemic in a sympathizing and mundane way 
showing he knows very well these ordinary problems. For instance, in an interview he told: ‘(…) I 
know exactly that staying home with two or three children (…) is the jihad in itself’35. Beyond these 
references another way to involve ‘the people’ into the crisis management was that pro-government 
think tanks published a lot of polls during the crisis, and their results have become a constant reference 
point in the pro-government media public to show that ‘the people’ highly support the governments’ 
measures. To present this support more clearly, in July the government launched a National 
Consultation where citizens can express their opinion about the crisis management through directed 
and carefully selected questions. As discussed before, the main function of these National 
Consultation is to justify popular support for the government’s measures, and show that the 
government acts in line with the people’s will.  The questionnaire included questions about what 
measures the government should do in the future (e.g. free internet for teachers, strengthen the 
protection of elderly home), but there were items about George Soros (‘Do you reject George Soros’s 
plan, which would put our homeland in debt for an unforeseeably long period of time?’), immigration, 
‘hostile foreign acquisition’ of companies by ‘international financial speculators’ and Brussels’ 
‘offensive against the immigration-related regulations of the Hungarian constitution’ as closely 
related issues to the pandemic.36 
In line with the central narrative of the ‘populist myth’, the relationship between the incumbent elite 
and ‘the people’ is not presented as conflicting, instead their organic unity and cooperation are 
emphasized. Orbán often stressed that an effective crisis management requires proper collaboration 
 
35 Radio Kossuth, 04/17/2020 




between the incumbent elite and ‘the people’. At the same time, strong elite criticism is an important 
part of the crisis communication, but as a usual element of the prevailing discourse, this is directed 
to the global, especially the European elites. The major sphere of this anti-elitist rhetoric is the strong 
international and national critiques of the Coronavirus Act enacted at the end of March. As a response 
of concerns expressed by international and national actors, the government and its allied media argued 
that the liberal mainstream including the European political elites, international media outlets, NGOs 
and their affiliated national allies such as the opposition and the left-liberal media attacked the country 
and its government who put its all efforts to defend the nation from the pandemic. This attack is 
politically motivated as this liberal mainstream aims at overthrowing the government and therefore 
want to make the crisis management to be unsuccessful. They also highlight that these international 
and national actors are all connected by being supported by George Soros, the Hungarian-American 
billionaire, the main enemy of the government. Soros was also accused of using the crisis for his own 
economic interests with his idea about the perpetual bonds European Union should use to finance the 
recovery. Orbán referred to this idea as Soros-plan 2.0 which aims at making European Union to be 
‘debt slavery’. A further recurring claim was in the pro-government media public that the sharp fall 
in the value of the Hungarian forint in the first weeks of the pandemic was due to Soros’s speculative 
intervention motivated by his own political and economic interests. European political elites were 
also highly criticized by pro-government actors for their inefficiency in crisis management. They 
often argued that Western European countries and the European Union failed in protecting their 
citizens which was usually contrasted with the Hungarian and Central-Eastern European crisis 
management presented as highly successful. Overall, these arguments are recurring elements of the 
dominant pro-government discourse in Hungary, the construction of the politically motivated, 
interconnected and inefficient European elites is a major ingredient of the ‘populist myth’ discussed 
by Körösényi and his colleagues (2020). 
At least since 2015 the outgroup in the image of ‘immigrants’ is also an inherent part of this narrative. 
However, during the pandemic this element was dominant only in the first weeks of the crisis, later 
its presence was rather marginal. At this first phase, pro-government actors, including Orbán, often 
argued that there is a clear link between the pandemic and immigration, and for these reasons the 
defence of the borders and the rigid immigration policy are crucial to protect ‘the Hungarians’. This 
narrative was amplified by the fact that the first infected cases were students from Iran who were 
reported to aggressively confront to the protective measures in the hospital and violate quarantine 
rules. This incident received heightened attention in the pro-government media sphere, and the 
Operational Group being responsible for the daily information service also intensively reported about 
it. A few days later the government expelled these students from the country. Later less words were 
devoted to immigrants by pro-government actors, and though the argument about the link between 
the pandemic and immigration did not disappear entirely, the topic became marginal in the crisis 
communication. The Chinese origin of the crisis was not problematized in the government’s 
discourse. Instead, China appeared as a supportive ally who is the main provider of protective 
equipment owing to the great commercial relationships built up previously by the government.     
 
 
4. The politicization of COVID-19 issue by populists 
Given the fact that populists in Hungary are in governmental position, and the Coronavirus Act gave 
them even stronger authority, they could easily and immediately enact any idea. In fact, pro-
government actors often highlighted that they were able to make and implement the most important 
decisions much sooner than other countries that is the main reason of the effective crisis management. 
They also stressed that this effective decision-making was made possible by the highly criticized 
Coronavirus Act which allowed the PM to manage the crisis personally. In the managing phase, 
Orbán stated that the Coronavirus Act was his best decision over the last ten years. As the Act is 
shown as the main force of the successful crisis management, its previous opponents could be easily 
 
 
presented retrospectively as who seriously endangered the effective protection of the people during 
the pandemic.  
However, during the emergence phase the topic of COVID-19 received less attention by pro-
government actors. Although preventing measures such as setting up the Operational Group and the 
acceptance of an Action Plan were made at the end of January, the Prime Minister kept distance from 
the topic until the middle of March. As a sign of the depoliticized approach, the issue was managed 
by lower level policy makers indicating that the government considered it to be a policy rather than 
political question. For instance, at the end of February, Orbán missed his usual speech in the opening 
day of the spring session of the parliament to give the floor to the Minister of Human Resources to 
talk about the COVID-19 situation, while he told in an interview that ‘although the coronavirus is 
attracting now all the attention, the historical challenge we face is still the migration itself’37. In this 
period, it was only the opposition that tried to politicize the topic by emphasizing that the health care 
system is not well-prepared for the pandemic which attempts were highly criticized by pro-
government politicians and media actors who often accused the opposition politicians and media 
outlets of overstating the challenge and making panic. 
Since the virus appeared in Hungary, this approach has suddenly changed, and the PM has become 
the clear leader of the crisis management both in the government’s communication and the pro-
governmental media (see, Merkovity et al., 2020). While this change indicates that the government 
no longer considered the topic as a pure policy question that should be managed by politicians being 
responsible for the specific area, their main argument was that the crisis management cannot have a 
politics aspect. Governmental political actors argued that the crisis management is exclusively about 
protecting people from the medical and economic consequences of the pandemic, and any politics-
related interpretation or claim is invalid and harmful from this respect. According to them the 
effective crisis management requires national unity and to set aside any political rivalry. This 
approach is also stressed by comparing the situation to war time and describing it war-like metaphors.  
However, as a reversed form of politicization, this problem-solving approach was attributed only to 
the government, and any critique of their measures made by the opposition, professional associations 
such as the Hungarian Medical Chamber or teachers’ union, NGOs, experts or media outlets was 
labelled as politically motivated attack, and pro-government politicians usually highlight their alleged 
underlying political motives. While this strategy appeared in several issues related to the crisis 
management, it was the most prominent in case of the national and international controversy about 
the Coronavirus Act. The pro-government politicians and media actors argued that this law is the 
most important tool for the effective defence and its exclusive purpose is to make this possible. Its 
opponents including the international and national political actors, media and NGOs attack it only 
because they want to make the crisis management unsuccessful as this could result in the fall of the 
government. To sum up, the ‘naming’ appeared in a reversed way as the main argument was that 
while the government manages the crisis as it is without any political motivation, its opponents make 
strong efforts to politicize the issue in line with their power interests.  
The pro-government actors often stressed that their crisis management strongly relied on the opinions 
of scientists and experts. Orbán also claimed that he is not too familiar with the topic therefore he 
needs to consult with scientists frequently to make reasonable decisions, and on his Facebook page 
he often showed segments from his meetings with experts. However, he also made it clear that expert 
opinions are unable to substitute political decisions, and drew a definite line between the expert and 
political knowledge. He argued that expert opinions cannot guide political measures directly as 
political decisions are more based on the ‘common sense’ that he owns. Expert opinions serve only 
as a crucial factual background for these ‘common sense’-based political decisions. However, it is 
also important to note that while Orbán and other pro-government actors often referred to the 
importance of embracing scientists’ knowledge and opinions, these experts were hardly visible in 
front of the public. The official faces of the information service beyond the Surgeon General of 
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Hungary were from policing bodies therefore people in uniforms were a determining visual feature 
of the official crisis communication. 
In the phase of confrontation, blaming played an important role in the communication of the 
government. While the government kept highlighting the efficiency of their measures, for the existing 
problems the newly elected oppositional mayor of the capital city, Karácsony, was mostly blamed. 
The main object of these critiques was the fact that an elderly care home run by the municipality of 
Budapest has become the primarily node of the Hungarian pandemic. Pro-government actors and 
media outlets made Karácsony personally responsible for this incident and argued that his passive 
and ineffective political leadership and crisis management led to this tragic event. Orbán also strongly 
blamed the mayor, criticizing sharply his personal leadership quality and abilities, and mentioned that 
after the crisis his responsibility would be examined in legal way. Naturally, Karácsony kept refusing 
his personal responsibility for this incident, instead he argued that some government measures and 
the lack of proper information-services lead to these infections. Further, it is important to note that 
Karácsony was already under attack before this incident as his several measures were highly criticized 
by pro-government actors. Another repeatedly blamed actor was the European Union that was 
presented as passive, ineffective and unhelpful in the crisis management while highly active in 
political-motivated attacks against the government. As an evidence for the inefficacy of the European 
Union, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) were often highlighted since 
it predicted the risk of the pandemic to be moderate in its reports until the middle of February which 




Hungary is a case of populist governance since 2010. Fidesz and its leader, Viktor Orbán, have been 
using populist political strategy and populist communication patterns for the past decade or more. 
This blend of strong leadership, illiberal measures, direct communication with the electorate as well 
as the construction of the ‘populist myth’ of the strong community of Hungarians versus hostile 
liberal elites and their protégés, the immigrants was simply adapted to the circumstances of the 
pandemic. While the government hold that the effective containment of the disease is a national 
challenge that should not be politicized, any criticism coming from social or political actors were 
immediately labelled as ‘political’. However, a small, but important detail is that Orbán, unlike other 
populist leaders like Bolsonaro or Trump, never questioned the importance of expert knowledge. At 
the same time his relationship to expertise has been somewhat ambiguous: medical experts have not 
been pushed in the forefront of communication with the public and Orbán made clear several times 
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